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ABSTRACT 
 The U.S. Navy (USN) relies on ports to enable operations and project power, but 
many of our ports remain vulnerable to attack and natural disaster. To manage future 
conflict, the USN must plan for port resilience and develop resilience-enabling 
technologies that support ship refueling operations. We develop a framework and model 
capable of studying refueling at ports before and after disruptions. Our framework adapts 
standard tools for discrete event simulation of ship arrival and refueling, and we 
demonstrate its use for a simple port. Our methods also enable the analysis of resilience 
technologies currently being developed by the USN. We study two USN technologies: 
one enables fast port recovery, and the other enables extended port operations but does 
not speed up recovery. We find both technologies capable of providing resilience to ports 
in their own unique ways. Based on our analysis, we provide recommendations for how 
the USN should deploy both technologies, which enables efficient acquisition and port 
resilience. 
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Executive Summary
The U.S. Navy (USN) relies on ports throughout the Indo-Pacific in order to enable oper-
ations and project power throughout the vast region. Many of these remote Pacific Island 
ports fall within the missile ranges of our adversaries, making them likely targets in an era 
of renewed great power competition. These facilities are also vulnerable to natural disasters, 
the effects of climate change, and age-related deterioration of infrastructure components. 
Destruction or disruption of these critical facilities has the potential to cripple refueling 
capabilities in the region. As a means to survive, recover, and adapt to these challenges, 
the USN must plan for port resilience and develop resilience-enabling technologies. In 
particular, the USN must develop resilience technologies that support refueling operations 
for wartime and non-wartime ship deployments during and after major port disruptions.
Two organizations in the USN focused on the development of resilience-enabling tech-
nologies for Indo-Pacific p orts a re N aval F acilities E ngineering C ommand (NAVFAC) 
Engineering & Expeditionary Warfare Center (EXWC) and Naval Sea Systems Command 
(NAVSEA) Operational Logistics Integration Program (OPLOG). Together, each organi-
zation is already developing several resilience-enabling technologies to ensure ship and 
aircraft refueling during future conflict and disasters. However, there is currently no method 
for prioritizing the use and deployment of these new technologies. This is problematic as 
different technologies support resilience in distinct ways. A lack of methods to compare re-
silience technologies and recommend when and where to deploy them limits their potential 
benefits and may lead to inefficient acquisition and operational planning.
To address this shortfall, we create a framework to simulate and assess port refueling 
operations. Our framework centers on discrete event simulation due to the complexity and 
dynamic nature of port refueling operations, especially after disruptions. We create our 
framework using objects from Simio’s Standard and Flow libraries that are capable of 
modeling refueling at any commercial or non-commercial port. We use these pieces to 
develop a Baseline Model of a simple port consisting of a single channel entrance, single 
refueling berth, and a single fuel storage tank. We analyze refueling operations with our 
Baseline Model by simulating military refueling needs during a permissive (non-wartime) 
and wartime scenario. Together, our framework and Baseline Model offer a simple and
xv
extensible tool for modeling refueling at real ports in the Indo-Pacific.
One of the benefits of our framework and model is that they enable the analysis of port
disruptions on non-wartime and wartime refueling needs. We study the impact that dis-
ruptions have on port operations by modeling a disruption that shuts down the berth and
tank for 7 days. Results show that even in a non-wartime scenario, a disruption with 7-day
recovery time can lead to a 44.2% reduction in total demand met in the 14-days following
the disruption. Our model also shows long-term effects lasting 4–6 months after the initial
disruption.
Our framework and model also enable the analysis of refueling technologies being devel-
oped in the USN to determine their resilience benefits. We study two distinct resilience
technologies to show the flexibility of our framework: the Navy Fuel Infrastructure Rapid
Repair Solutions (NFIRRS) developed by NAVFAC EXWC and the Seabased Petroleum
Distribution System (SPDS) developed by NAVSEA OPLOG. NFIRRS can be understood
as a containerized, deployable infrastructure recovery and repair kit, whereas SPDS can
be thought of as a submersible fuel barge that acts as a replacement or additional refuel-
ing berth. Both technologies enable port resilience, but each provide it in a distinct way.
NFIRRS enables fast recovery of failed systems, but does not change system capacity or
configuration. In contrast, SPDS enables extended operations beyond that of the original
port, but does not speed up recovery of failed systems.
We find both NFIRRS and SPDS capable of providing resilience to ports in their own unique
way. In a non-wartime scenario, NFIRRS fast repair nearly eliminates the impact that the
disruption has on port refueling operations. However, during awartime scenario with a surge
in arriving USN ships, NFIRRS appears to be less efficient in the near-term (weeks) and
long-term (months) after a disruption compared to other resilience technologies. In contrast,
SPDS without repair offers an adaptability approach to resilience, resulting in operations
being shifted to an entirely new system. We see that this reduces the expected impact of the
disruption by approximately 30%, but it leads to a long term drop in performance due to
the port having reduced capacity compared its original configuration. Finally, SPDS with
repair offers an extensibility approach to resilience, where the port disruption is repaired in
conjunction with the deployment of the new system. This configuration not only provides
immediate benefit in response to a disruption, but it also leads to better port operations in
xvi
the long term. At approximately 6-months post-disruption, we expect SPDS with recovery
to provide an additional 5.8% and 10.1% of operational capability during non-wartime and
wartime scenarios, respectively.
We recommend that the USN invests in both NFIRRS and SPDS. NFIRRS is easy to deploy
and relatively low cost compared to SPDS. NFIRRS is also best suited for non-wartime
scenarios out of all the resilience options studied. In contrast, SPDS with repair provides
new capacity to extend operations in the long term which leads to better port operations
for smaller ports that may need the additional capacity during wartime. On its own, SPDS
without repair can help manage and mitigate the impacts of disruptions even when timely
port repair efforts are not possible.
Overall, our framework, model, and analysis provides a basis for future work relevant
to the USN and Indo-Pacific region. Avenues for future work include implementing and
comparing other resilience technologies and exploring the combined effects of multiple
resilience technologies. Our methods can also be implemented to study a real-world port or
another system configuration (e.g., aircraft refueling).
xvii
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Throughout history, ports have played a vital role in commerce, transportation, and survival.
Ports and harbors are the backbone waterfront infrastructure linking human activity to the
open water. Harbors are coastal areas bounded by natural or artificial structures that provide
refuge and protection for maritime vessels during extreme weather events. Ports are areas
within a harbor with accompanying facilities for loading and unloading ships, transferring
cargo, or moving passengers. In 2014, ports were responsible for over $4.6 trillion in
economic activity in theUnited States, whichmade up roughly 26%of the nation’s economy.
In addition to serving a vital economic role by linking land and sea transport and connecting
trade partners globally, ports are also critical enablers of power projection, as they extend
the operational reach of our forces across the globe.
This thesis focuses on developing models and measures of the resilience of ports and
port operations relevant for U.S. Navy (USN) military operations. Historically, the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) relied on ports owned and operated by the military services
for operations and power projection. Shifting threat landscapes, including increased great
power competition with near-peer adversaries and natural disasters associated with climate
change, requires greater knowledge of how ports operate in contested and disrupted regions.
1.1 Port Systems
The U.S. DOD through the Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) provides explicit definitions of
ports, the systems that comprise ports, and the services they provide for military operations.
Department of Defense (2010b, p. 6) defines a harbor as “a water area that is bounded by
natural features or manmade structures or a combination of both,” and a harbor is designated
as a port when it is “used to transfer cargo or passengers.”When military services use a port,
the facility is referred to as a military port—depending on the activity, a military port can
also be referred to as a naval base, naval station, naval depot, or naval shipyard (Department
of Defense 2010b). Figure 1.1 shows several port configurations.
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Figure 1.1. Common Ports and their Configurations. Harbors can be either
artificial or protected. Artificial harbors include inland and offshore basins.
Protected harbors can be inland and offshore as well, with more varied con-
figurations. Source: Department of Defense (2010b, p. 8).
Ports provide numerous services for ships, including refuge, safe moorings, and protection
for vessels during severe weather events and accommodations for water-to-land activities
such as refueling, resupply, repair, and the transfer of personnel and cargo. Key port infras-
tructure that enable these services are piers and wharves and utility systems.
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1.1.1 Piers and Wharves
Piers and wharves act as parking infrastructure that enables the safe mooring of ships
(Figure 1.2). Department of Defense (2017, p. 164) defines a pier as “a structure that
projects out from the shore into the water” onto which ships can be moored. It goes on to
describe that piers are usually oriented perpendicular to the shore and are typically used on
both sides. Department of Defense (2017, p. 165) defines a wharf as “a structure oriented
approximately parallel to the shore” onto which ships can be moored. UFC 4-152-01
classifies piers and wharves into one of four primary types.
Type I - fueling, ammunition, and supply piers and wharves are descibed as follows (De-
partment of Defense 2017, p. 2):
Fueling. These are dedicated piers and wharves equipped with facilities for
off-loading fuel from ship to storage and for fueling ships from storage.
Ammunition. These are dedicated piers and wharves used for discharging am-
munition for storage and for loading ammunition on outgoing ships.
Supply. Supply piers and wharves are used primarily for the transfer of cargo
between ships and shore facilities. (Department of Defense 2017, p. 2)
Type II - general-purpose piers and wharves are described as follows (Department of
Defense 2017, p. 2):
Berthing. General-purpose piers and wharves are used primarily for moor-
ing ships. Furthermore, berthing facilities may be active, as when ships are
berthed for relatively short times and are ready to put to sea on short notice,
and inactive, as when they are berthed for long periods in a reserve status.
Depending upon intended pier usage, i.e. active berthing, maintenance/repair,
inactive berthing, consider appropriate mooring service type as it relates to
design/capacity of mooring fixtures. Activities that typically take place on
berthing piers and wharves are personnel transfer, maintenance, crew training,
cargo transfer, maintenance, and waste handling. Under some circumstances,
fueling and weapons system testing may also be carried out in these facilities.
(Department of Defense 2017, p. 2)
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Type III - repair piers and wharves are described as follows (Department of Defense 2017,
p. 2–3):
Repair. Repair piers and wharves are constructed and equipped to permit over-
haul of ships and portions of a hull above the waterline. These structures are
generally equipped with portal cranes or designed to accommodate heavy mo-
bile cranes.
Floating Dry Docks. Piers and wharves for floating dry docks are constructed
and equipped to permit overhaul of ships above and below the waterline. (De-
partment of Defense 2017, p. 2–3)
Type IV - specialized piers and wharves are described as follows (Department of Defense
2017, p. 3):
Magnetic Treatment and Electromagnetic Roll Piers. These are piers that moor
ships over an array of underwater instruments and large-area cable solenoids
used specifically for removing and/or modifying the magnetic signature charac-
teristics of surface vessels and submarines, as well as calibrating the on-board
degaussing systems of mine countermeasure vessels.
Training, Small Craft, and Specialized Vessels.These piers andwharves are typ-
ically light structures designed for specific but limited functions. (Department
of Defense 2017, p. 3)
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Figure 1.2. Pier and wharf examples. (a) Piers are structures that contain
mooring locations oriented approximately perpendicular to the shoreline,
whereas wharves are oriented approximately parallel to the shore line, (b)
Island wharves are used for the transfer of bulk liquid cargo and are used in
areas where the water depths close to shore do not allow for the accommo-
dation of deep draft ships. They consist of a platform on piles connected to
shore via submarine pipeline. Source: Department of Defense (2017, p. 7).
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1.1.2 Utility Systems
A central function of piers and wharves is to provide ship-to-shore utilities connections
(Department of Defense 2017). Some of the main types of utility services that can be found
at waterfront infrastructure include (Department of Defense 2010a):
Compressed Air
Compressed air systems are typically required at all repair and active berthing—ships use
compressed air for a variety of purposes; while in port, compressed air is mainly used for the
operation of pneumatic tools such as grinders, chisels, and painting equipment (Department
of Defense 2010a, p. 24).
Electricity
Ships use shore-provided electricity for a number for purposes, these include: hotel service
(shore-to-ship power), ship repair (industrial power), systems testing, pier weight-handling
equipment, cathodic protection systems, pier lighting, and miscellaneous pier electrical
systems (Department of Defense 2010a, p. 74).
Marine Fuel Receiving and Dispensing
Marine fuel receiving and dispensing typically occurs at dedicated fuel piers and wharves
that are designed specifically for the handling of fuel; however, “[i]n some cases, permanent
fuel piping and system components may be installed on berthing piers which were not
primarily designed for handling fuel”—these facilities are typically only used for providing
fuel to surface combatants (Department of Defense 2020, p. 95).
Saltwater (Non-potable) Water
Saltwater services are used mainly for flushing/cooling and firefighting; however, the USN
requires all vessels at active berth to have self-sufficient saltwater pumping capabilities for
such purposes, and shore-provided saltwater systems are typically only provided at facilities
used for ship repair at which the vessel does not have self-sufficient saltwater pumping
capabilities (Department of Defense 2010a, p. 29).
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Steam
Department of Defense (2010a, p. 15) describes that steam systems can be found at most
waterfront structures used for ship repair and berthing; however, newer USN vessels do not
require steam services, with the exception of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
1.2 Ports and Great Power Competition
In the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), the U.S. government declared China and
Russia to be authoritarian revisionist powers that seek “to shape a world antithetical to
U.S. values and interests” (Trump 2017). The NSS further declares that China is attempting
to use its rapidly growing political, economic, military power to displace the U.S. as the
predominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; meanwhile, “Russia seeks to restore its great
power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders” (Trump 2017). To face these
challenges, the NSS directs the military to renew America’s competitive advantage and
renew its capabilities. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) plays a key role in identifying
the capabilities required by the DOD to support the objectives of the NSS.
The 2018 NDS declares that “[t]he central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the
reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy
classifies as revisionist powers” (i.e., China and Russia) (Mattis 2018, p. 2). The document
directs the DOD to focus fiscal year 2019–2023 budgets on investments that modernize sev-
eral key capabilities that directly address the rapid capability advances of U.S. competitors
and adversaries. Two of the key modernization areas listed in the NDS that are relevant to
our research are (Mattis 2018, p. 6–7):
Forward force maneuver and posture resilience. Investments that will prioritize
ground, air, sea, and space forces that can deploy, survive, operate, maneuver,
and regenerate in all domains while under attack. Transitioning from large,
centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive
basing that include active and passive defenses will also be prioritized.
Resilient and agile logistics. Investments that will prioritize prepositioned for-
ward stocks and munitions, strategic mobility assets, partner and allied support,
as well as non-commercially dependent distributed logistics and maintenance
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to ensure logistics sustainment while under persistent multi-domain attack.
(Mattis 2018, p. 6–7)
In the latest Tri-Service Maritime Strategy that is a collaboration between the USN, the U.S.
Marine Corps (USMC), and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Berger et al. (2020, p. 5) contends
that:
China’s and Russia’s revisionist approaches in the maritime environment
threaten U.S. interests, undermine alliances and partnerships, and degrade
the free and open international order. Moreover, China’s and Russia’s aggres-
sive naval growth and modernization are eroding U.S. military advantages.
Unchecked, these trends will leave the Naval Service unprepared to ensure our
advantage at sea and protect national interests within the next decade.
The NSS, NDS, and the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy each place China and Russia as
the primary threats to U.S. interests and security throughout world. Together they lay out a
strategy to restore the United States’ competitive advantage over China and Russia in order
to deter any challenges to the international order that has been in place since the conclusion
of World War II. With this aim comes a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific region.
1.2.1 The Indo-Pacific Region and Ports
The Indo-Pacific region contains over half of the world’s population, the top four economies
in the world (U.S., China, Japan, and India), five of the world’s nine nuclear countries
(U.S., China, India, North Korea, and Russia), six U.S. treaty ally nations (Australia, Japan,
New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, and Thailand); it also contains the world’s
busiest international shipping routes with nine of world’s ten largest seaports (Bowers and
Wood 2020). In 2018, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) was renamed U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command (USINDOPACOM) in order to signify the importance of the Indian Ocean area
as well as Indian Ocean ally nations to the U.S. and its interests (Department of Defense
2018).
Bowers and Wood (2020, p. 2) state, “U.S. installations in the Indo-Pacific stand as lit-
toral bulwarks, situated where all warfighting domains—sea, air, land, space, and cy-
berspace—intersect and collide. They underwrite the nation’s maritime strength and are the
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Figure 1.3. USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility. USINDOPACOM en-
compasses approximately half the earth’s surface, stretching from the wa-
ters off the west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, and from
Antarctica to the North Pole. Figure from USINDOPACOM (2021).
most tangible expression of U.S. commitments to forward deterrence and defense in the re-
gion. Together, they constitute a “shield of the Indo-Pacific,” providing a critical 6,000-mile
head start in protecting the U.S. homeland, advancing national interests, and extending the
reach, versatility, and endurance of naval expeditionary forces.” These critical installations
will be become increasingly tempting targets as the U.S. continues down the path of great
power competition with near-peer adversaries.
The Indo-Pacific region is particularly important with respect to great power competition
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC is rapidly developing, modernizing,
9
and deploying a sophisticated cruise and ballistic missile arsenal; this arsenal is a key com-
ponent that enables the implementation of their anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy in
the Indo-Pacific region (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2020). Their missile
arsenal, partially depicted in Figure 1.4, is comprised of a combination of ballistic and
cruise missiles launched from air, land, and sea that are capable of targeting U.S. and U.S.
allied military assets in the Indo-Pacific.
Figure 1.4. Coverage Areas of Chinese Ballistic and Cruise Missiles. Figure
from Center for Strategic and International Studies (2020)
1.3 Port Resilience and Refueling Operations
The U.S. DOD requires resilient port refueling operations in order to ensure uninterrupted
military operations in the Indo-Pacific region. In preparing for a future conflict with a
near-peer adversary like China or Russia, the U.S. must be ready to face robust A2/AD
strategies combined with increased offensive strike capabilities. Critical port infrastructure
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will likely be tempting targets for enemy cruise and ballistic missiles. These facilities
are also vulnerable to natural disasters and other events such as age-related deterioration.
Destruction or disruption of these critical facilities has the potential to cripple port refueling
operations. Infrastructure resilience improvements must be planned for well in advance so
that effective resilience investments can be made available when they are needed.
Resilience is defined as “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and
withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions; resilience includes the ability to withstand
and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents”
(White House Office of the Press Secretary 2013). The term vulnerability, as it relates to
critical infrastructure systems, is used “to describe inherent characteristics of a system that
create the potential for harm” (Sarewitz et al. 2003). Vulnerability can also be thought of
as the degree that a system can be affected by a particular risk (Aven et al. 2018).
1.3.1 Models of Port Vulnerabilities
Assessing resilience first requires measures of system vulnerability. One way we do this
is develop a model to capture the logic of the functioning system and use it to measure
the impact of specific disruption events or single and/or multiple component failures. This
process of identifying the combinations of elements which lead to the loss of the system
function will enable the identification of critical vulnerabilities within our port model. From
there we will be able to implement and analyze various resilience capabilities in order assess
their impact on port refueling operations.
1.3.2 Resilience Capabilities for Port Refueling Operations
Once port vulnerabilities are identified, overcoming these vulnerabilities requires the use
of new system designs and operations. The U.S. DOD identified port resilience as a key
issue and already leads several efforts to ensure refueling operations in contested and
disrupted situations. In particular, two USN organizations that are developing mitigation
measures to address some port vulnerabilities are theNaval Facilities EngineeringCommand
(NAVFAC) Engineering and ExpeditionaryWarfare Center (EXWC) andNaval Sea Systems
Command (NAVSEA) Operational Logistics Integration Program (OPLOG). NAVFAC
EXWC is the Navy’s primary R&D, test, and evaluation center for shore and near-shore
facilities, underwater facilities, and expeditionary equipment (NAVFACEXWC2021). They
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deliver specialized facilities engineering, technology solutions, and life-cycle management
of expeditionary equipment to the Navy, Marine Corps, federal agencies, and other DOD
supported commands (NAVFAC EXWC 2021). Their mission is “to identify and apply
emerging engineering solutions through engineering, design, construction, consultation,
test and evaluation, technology demonstration, implementation, and program management
support” (NAVFAC EXWC 2021).
The NAVSEA OPLOG R&D Program focuses on Naval afloat logistics supply chain that
supports the Fleet through the Combat Logistics Force (CLF). Their focus is on developing
enabling technologies for future and in-service integrated supply systems and for afloat
operational logistics. One of OPLOG’s pillars of focus is in Bulk Fuel Distribution. In this
pillar, they focus on addressing OPNAV N42 priorities and capability gaps such as: the
ability to refuel combatants with current CLF fleet, additional CLF refueling options afloat,
refueling combatants in a contested environment, and bulk fuel delivery over the shore.
1.4 Thesis Goals
The goals of this thesis are to develop a discrete event simulation using Simio that mod-
els forward port refueling operations that will allow us to assess its capacity to provide
combat-logistics support for U.S. naval forces. We will use the model to identify critical
vulnerabilities to port refueling operations by modeling operations in a permissive and
contested environment. We will establish key measures of performance (MOPs) and mea-
sures of effectiveness (MOEs) by which we will be able to compare the port’s performance
across the various scenarios. We will then explore various risk mitigation options (infras-
tructure, repair technologies, active defensive measures, etc.) to assess their impact on the
MOPs/MOEs and the overall port resilience. Modeling port operations in both a permis-
sive and a contested environment will provide opportunities to identify ways to increase
resilience and improve defensive capabilities.
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CHAPTER 2:
Background and Literature Review
We review the general structure and function of military, commercial, and non-commercial
ports to determine key assets and their functions. We then review operational models of
port functions that consider port operations at local and regional scales. We relate these
models to different approaches to assess port vulnerabilities and the effect of infrastructure
disruptions on operations and missions. We build upon these works to develop a framework
that supports the modeling and analysis of port operations to support military refueling
requirements and missions.
2.1 Port Refueling Operations and Resilience
In general, harbors and ports are comprised of few key infrastructure assets that enable
safe ship mooring, off-loading and on-loading of supplies and services, and land-based
operations to support these activities. Ship refueling operations at ports relies on a subset of
systems meant to enable access and resupply of fuel. We review several of these infrastruc-
tures and their current condition as background on key elements that must be considered in
a general framework for port operations modeling. We focus attention on ports located in
the Pacific region as a key area of military operations for future framework use.
2.1.1 Pacific Island Ports
A detailed assessment of Pacific Island port infrastructure was provided by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (2008) during an evaluation following a magnitude 6.7
earthquake that struck the northwest coast of the island of Hawaii. This assessment was
to serve as an evaluation of potential mitigation measures and provide recommendations
relevant to other U.S. port facilities on the Pacific Ocean. We use this report to inform the




Dock structures (piers, wharves, quays, bulkheads and dolphins) at Pacific Island ports
tend to be remnants or expansions of World War II-era infrastructure or even older (1920s),
when the use of reinforced concrete was only just becoming amainstay constructionmethod.
The warm and humid environment and high salinity in the air pose significant corrosion
problems for structural steel, which in turn causes cracking and spalling that require local
repairs. Such repairs as well as earthquake damage repairs tend to make up the bulk of how
limitedmaintenance and repair budgets are spent at remote island ports. It is often difficult to
distinguish between pre-existing hidden corrosion damage and damage that is caused by an
earthquake. Historically, construction practices at these remote island ports have utilized the
locally available coral aggregate; however, more recent construction has employed higher
quality aggregate. Sheet piles at these ports consist of both concrete and driven steel. Newer
steel sheets typically have cathodic protection, whereas older steel sheets and tieback rods
exhibit advanced stages of corrosion, failure, and disrepair.
Fuel Tanks
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2008) concluded that fuel tanks at Pacific Island
ports are generally constructed of steel and are designed in accordance with provisions set
forth by the American Petroleum Institute; however, they are mostly old and exhibiting kinks
or irregular structural deformations that can be attributed to age or use. Tanks older than 50
years of age are not uncommon; however, tank age is generally not a problem with respect
to leakage, provided that regular maintenance and painting is performed. Pinhole corrosion
can be expected in most tanks of significant age which results in the presence of rainwater
on the surface of the fuel oils that are stored within the tank. Similarly, condensation inside
of the tanks will lead to internal corrosion. There are no occurrences of catastrophic fuel
tank failure at a Pacific Island port in recent history.
Fuel Piping
Fuel piping systems at Pacific Island ports tend to vary in age and in the quality of their
construction. Utility designs are typically based on local design practices/techniques, with
little attention paid to geotechnical or structural issues. Trench back-fill is mostly granular
material; it is usually unknown what, if any, compaction standards were adhered to during
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installation. Maintenance and repairs are routinely performed by local maintenance per-
sonnel who possess limited experience. The surrounding material of fuel line trenches is
generally composed of loose dredged fills that are highly susceptible to seismic movements.
The performance of utilities such as underground fuel piping during extreme weather condi-
tions and seismic events is anticipated to be poor. Anticipated failures in such events include
severed connections at dock structures and off-site hookups and washout of trench back-fill
that could result in severed lines.
Waterfront Structures
Waterfront structures at Pacific Island ports tend to consist mostly of transit sheds and
operating buildings that are a mixture of reinforced-concrete structures and masonry con-
struction. The age of these facilities is typically consistent with the age of their associated
dock structures, so in the case of Pacific Island waterfront structures, this tends to be
WWII-era and older. Design standards tend to follow some version of the Uniform Building
Code, thus they are reasonably well suited to handle seismic activity and severe weather
without collapse (though extensive damage should be expected). Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA)’s Seismic Mitigation Guidelines for Pacific Island Ports found
little evidence of seismic retrofits or ground improvements at waterfront structures.
Summary of Pacific Island Port Infrastructure Condition
The general takeaway from FEMA’s assessment is that Pacific Island port infrastructure
is well beyond of its useful economic life, not designed to modern seismic/construction
standards, and in need of replacement due to age and corrosion.
2.1.2 Port Vulnerabilities
In addition to fuel, key assets and systems are required for port refueling operations. These
systems are exposed to a diverse set of span a broad range of factors including: natural
disasters, human factors, technological factors, and organizational factors. The fish-bone
diagram in Figure 2.1 provides a comprehensive overview of the vulnerabilities facing port
operations.
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Figure 2.1. Potential Threats to Port Operations. This fish-bone diagram
details a comprehensive list of potential threats to port operations that could
ultimately result in a port disruption or closure. The potential threats are
grouped into seven factor classifications: economic, environmental, human,
access, network, technological, and organizational factors. Source: Grainger
and Achuthan (2014).
Earthquakes are one of the key natural disaster vulnerabilities facing ports in the Pacific.
Figure 2.2 summarizes the risk profile for several key Pacific Island ports to earthquakes.
The majority of the remote Pacific Island ports listed are under a significant risk for seismic
disruptions that carry severe consequences due to the lifeline role that the ports provide
their respective islands.
16
Figure 2.2. Risk Profile for U.S. Pacific Island Ports. The conceptual seismic
risk profile for Pacific Island ports following a 2008 FEMA assessment. The
majority of the remote Pacific Island ports are under significant risk for
seismic disruptions that carry severe consequences due to the lifeline role




Today’s infrastructure systems have grown to be complex networks of interdependencies.
This shift has been aided by the emergence of new technologies and has been driven by
the desires of various stakeholders to have systems that operate better, cheaper, faster, and
more efficiently. Operating these efficient, interdependent networks has had the unintended
consequences of resulting in systems that can be vulnerable to sudden dramatic failure. This
has led many to study complex systems with respect to the notion of resilience.
The definition of resilience according to Presidential PolicyDirective (PPD) 21was provided
in Section 1.3, and Woods (2015) notes that there are four core concepts of resilience:
• Resilience as rebound evaluates how well a system recovers from the disrupting event
and returns to its previous activities.
• Resilience as robustness can be thought of as the system’s ability to absorb a variety
of disturbances. When robustness is increased, the set of potential disruptions that the
system can respond to effectively is expanded.
• Resilience as extensibility can be thought of as a measure of how well a system with
finite resources can be stretched to accommodate events that challenge boundaries.
• Resilience as adaptability can be though of as the system’s ability to change and
evolve in response to future surprises.
Overall, a framework for assessing port resilience requires consideration of system function
for refueling, model flexibility to consider a diversity of vulnerabilities, and ways to quantify
the benefits of rebound, robustness, extensibility, and adaptability.
2.2 Models of Port Operations and Resilience
In general, past studies on port resilience focus attention on modeling system function, vul-
nerabilities, resilience capacities, or a combination thereof. Few studies are comprehensive
to inform all aspects of port resilience. Moreover, much of the previous work concerning
port resilience has focused on the role maritime ports play in national or global supply
chains, rather than modeling the operations within a single port or system of ports. We
review several studies that inform technical methods for measuring port operations and
system function, the impact of failures and disruptions on the port, and the benefits of
resilience-enabling technologies.
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2.2.1 Port Resilience and the Maritime Supply Chain
Wendler-Bosco andNicholson (2020) provides an extensive literature review on the research
into the impact of port disruptions on the maritime supply chain. The authors also examine
the existing body of literature on port resilience and note that the number of available
studies examining port resilience or disaster resilience is scarce. The authors point out that
there is insufficient work to properly understand the cascading effects that port disruptions
can have on the entire supply chain. Wendler-Bosco and Nicholson conclude by stressing
the importance for filling the research gaps in port resilience given the importance of
ports in global supply chain, coupled with their susceptibility to natural disasters and other
disruptions.
Wendler-Bosco (2020) provides research that gives insights related to tropical cyclones and
their potential impacts to the coastal United States, particularly with respect to disruptions
to ports and the maritime supply chain. Wendler-Bosco provides an extensive review on
the resilience of the maritime supply chain, and uses machine learning coupled with his-
torical data on hurricanes and tropical storms to explore and quantify the relationship of
tropical storm characteristic and their destructive outcomes. The author develops multiple
mathematical models to predict the economic impacts of tropical events. Finally, the author
extends this work to provide state-level coastal vulnerability analysis to aid decision-makers
in improving community resilience.
Becker et al. (2015) examines the impact that climate change is having and will continue
to have on human-environmental systems. In particular, the authors look at the impact
that increased storm activity and rising sea levels have on seaports, which are especially
vulnerable to these conditions due to their high-risk and environmentally sensitive locations.
The authors’ study provides a detailed analysis of the impact that hurricanes have on various
seaport stakeholders and is intended to benefit planners, practitioners, and other decision-
makers who are responsible for the formulation and implementation of seaport policy and
resilience plans.
2.2.2 Network Flows
Pidgeon (2008) introduced and developed a simulation modeling tool to evaluate the dis-
ruptions, delays, and incremental costs associated with transportation security incidents
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inflicted on the container shipping industry on the U.S. West Coast. Various scenarios,
such as striking union workers to earthquakes were considered. His operator’s model aids
in identifying potential bottlenecks and vulnerable infrastructure components, improving
security and capacity on existing commercial transportation infrastructure subject to the
constraint of limited available funding.
Bencomo (2009) extends the work of Pidgeon (2008) by developing a multi-modal network
flow model to represent the transportation of containerized cargo entering North America
from the East Coast and the West Coast. Bencomo’s attacker-defender model can be used
as a tool to help understand the potential impact of various disruptions to the maritime
shipping industry.
Babick (2009) introduces a method of performing network analysis on critical infrastructure
networks using a “Design-Attack-Defend model that determines the optimal defense plan
for a critical infrastructure network within a specified budget constraint” (Babick 2009). The
author demonstrates that this yields a solution that is at least as good as the Risk Analysis
Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) that is used by the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS).
Onuska (2012) developed an Operator’s Model that accurately models real system behavior
of coal transport through the Port of Pittsburgh. The author’s work allows for the testing of
various “what-if” threat scenarios. This work ultimately allows for the relative assessment
of critical infrastructure components in order to aid the USCG in better understanding the
criticality of the complex port system.
2.2.3 Queueing Networks
Ghosh Dastidar and Frazzoli (2011) present a framework for the stochastic scheduling of
aircraft carrier flight deck operations using queueing networks. They represent each station
that services the aircraft as separate nodes of the queueing network. They use this approach
to find an optimum scheduling policy that can be implemented by human decision makers
at each node. They demonstrate how their approach can handle system disruptions, like
unplanned outages, and show how it can be applied to a variety of other applications.
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Schroder (2014) applies a non-finite queueing theory to model the Port of Durban Container
Terminal in South Africa. He uses this model to obtain the ideal number of vehicles and
equipment necessary to yield a balanced system in which the least congestion and number of
delays is achieved. He then uses Simio simulation software to create a simulation model to
simulate the container terminal environment of the Port of Durban. The simulation model
is used to gain a different perspective by which to compare the results of the queueing
theory model to. Both modeling approaches yielded similar results that shared the same
basic concepts. His work resulted in recommendations for the number and type of weight
handling equipment in order to increase the container throughput at the Port of Durban.
2.2.4 Simulation Modeling
Geiser (2012) develops a discrete-event simulation to model airfield refueling operations.
Geiser uses this model to examine ways to improve aircraft refueling at Naval Air Station
(NAS) Oceana by adjusting key refueling parameters such number of fuel trucks available,
fuel level of each truck, and fuel flow rates. The author uses experimental design to analyze
and compare different decisions and provides NAS Oceana with recommendations for
improving efficiency and reducing fuel wait time.
Diogo et al. (2015) proposes and tests a procedure that couples stochastic queueing theory
models and agent-based simulation to allow for flexible port logistics management. The
authors consider an intermodal terminal where transport scheduling was performed by an
informed decision-maker at remote points in the system. The author then used Simio to
implement a simulation model that allows for the evaluation of the various decisions used
by the decision-maker and to assess the impact they would have on the rest of the export
logistics chain. The authors’ work resulted in useful insight in identifying key elements
necessary in order to reduce the impact of route congestion on a port logistic chain.
Shen (2017) presents a hybrid model for simulating the fuel supply, demand, and inventory
of remote coastal and island communities in British Columbia. Shen develops a hybrid
model consisting of a combination of system dynamics, agent-based, and discrete-event
modeling. The author uses this hybrid model to aid in the understanding of fuel resilience
by introducing various fuel disruptions and examining the results from the demand-side
perspective. Shen applies the model to a real case study location and uses it to test the
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effectiveness of various resilience strategies that the community can implement to help
better withstand fuel disruptions.
Kotachi (2018) develops, implements, and validates a novel framework for simulation-
optimization to study the influence of using ordered decision variables for the optimization
of resource allocation problems. Kotachi develops a large-scale discrete-event simulation
model of a complex container terminal which is used to implement and validate the frame-
work based on a real system. The author demonstrates the benefit of using discrete event
simulation to accurately model a complex stochastic system.
Vogel (2019) develops a discrete-event simulation for analyzing ballistic missile defense
(BMD) strike operations using Simio simulation software. The author models various
system components in left-of-launch theater ballistic missile (TBM) operations in order to
compare various system metrics focused on delaying the launch of TBMs. The author’s
work results in a notional model and experimentation method that can aid in determining
optimal locations for BMD operations.
2.2.5 Quantifying Resilience
Pant et al. (2014) present a mathematical and modeling framework for the analysis and
quantification of system resilience. The authors introduce stochastic measures of resilience
in order to quantify the resilience of inland waterway ports. The authors’ work is intended
as a basis for framework development related to resilience decision making.
Xu et al. (2019) establish a modeling framework that can be used to measure resilience of
the handling chain system (HCS) at container ports. The authors use linear and non-linear
models to establish measures of resilience for the HCS at container ports. The authors’
work is intended to serve as a starting point for framework development related to resilience
decision making that can be used to assist in reducing disruption impacts on the port and
shipping supply chain.
Russell (2020) proposes a method of quantifying resilience that is consistent with the
National Science Foundation’s definition of resilience, “the ability to prepare and plan for,
absorb, recover from, or more successfully adapt to actual or potential adverse events”.
Russell identifies system states by measuring the system output and assigning a value
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between zero and one that represents one of the following states: stable pre-event state, 
absorption state, disrupted state, recovered state, and stable recovered state (Russell 2020). 
The author shows that this resilience measure can be applied to any transportation system 
by applying it to several complex, real-world systems, such as maritime ports, airports, and 
refueling systems.
Hosseini and Barker (2016) provide a method to quantify resilience using a Bayesian net-
work model that quantifies “resilience as a function of absorptive, adaptive, and restorative 
capacities” (Hosseini and Barker 2016). The Bayesian network model allows various re-
silience building strategies to be analyzed. The authors demonstrate the utility of this method 
in assessing intermodal transportation networks using a real-world example of an inland 
waterway port.
Hagen et al. (2016) developed a modeling paradigm for assessing the operational resilience 
of the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in a contested, A2/AD environment. In order to frame their 
problem, they focused on the regions of Southwest Asia and the Pacific. The result of this 
effort was the Operational Resilience Analysis Model (ORAM) which evaluates various 
courses of action and their impact on operational capability.
2.3 Our Approach
Building on the literature, we create a framework that allows us to simulate port refueling 
operations. This framework allows us to model system function, measure the impacts of 
various port disruptions, and measure the benefits of resilience-enabling technologies. We 
use discrete event simulation of a queuing system combined with continuous flow elements 
to represent port operations because it enables us to track how port refueling operations and 
disruptions unfold over time. This approach allows us to perform a detailed comparative 
analysis of port refueling operations under different system configurations a nd measure 
impacts over different time periods after port disruption. Ultimately, our framework and 
analysis provides recommendations related to the deployment and development of 
resilience-enabling technologies within the USN.
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This chapter describes the discrete event simulation model that we developed to analyze
typical port refueling operations. We present the software tool that is used to create the
model, we describe the basic building-blocks that make up the model, and finally we
describe how those building-blocks are combined to create a model of a simple port that
consists of a single refueling berth that is supplied by a single fuel storage tank.
3.1 Simio Simulation Software
We use the Simio simulation software package to build our simulation model. Simio is
a modeling tool that allows you to build and execute dynamic models of systems so that
you can see how the operation of the system plays out over time. It can be used to model
a wide variety of types of systems including manufacturing, defense, supply chain, and
transportation systems. Each of these systems are similar in that they have entities (parts,
trucks, ships, passengers, etc.) that are moving through the system that is constrained by
some resource (machines, roads, ports, vehicles, etc.). Modeling these types of systems is
accomplished by modeling the flow of entities through the system as well as the resources
that constrain that flow (Pegden 2014).
Simio employs an object-based approach to system modeling and simulation combined
with animation in which objects are selected from various libraries and placed graphically
within the model. Using this approach, we are able to create models that represent refueling
operations at existing ports and test resilience technologies that have yet to be developed.
3.1.1 Simio Model Objects
We implement various objects from Simio’s Standard Library and Flow Library in our port




Model entities are objects that move through the simulation model. Entities are dynamically
created by sources, routed over a network of links and nodes, serviced by servers, and
destroyed by sinks. Entities can have a designated speed at which they travel through the
model. A special entity type from Simio’s Flow Library, called ContainerEntity, has an
associated container that is capable of carrying a volume of fluid; the capacity and initial
volume of ContainerEntity objects can be specified.
Sources
Sources are objects that generate entities of a specified type and arrival pattern and insert
them into the simulationmodel. The number of entities generated per arrival can be specified
explicitly or chosen randomly from a distribution.
Servers
Servers are objects from Simio’s Standard Library that represent a capacity-constrained
process such as a machine or service operation. Entities that enter a server undergo a
process that can either be designated as a specific time (or time distribution) or a task
sequence. A server’s simultaneous processing capacity can be either limited or infinite.
Once a server has completed processing, the entities wait in an output queue until they are
routed to the next destination.
Tanks
Tank objects are from Simio’s Flow Library and are used to model a volume capacity-
constrained location for holding a volume of fluid for distribution within the model. Tanks
are interconnected within the system model via FlowConnector objects or Pipe objects.
They are filled via Emptier objects, and they deliver fluid to other containers via Filler
objects.
Fillers
Filler objects are a unique type of Server object from Simio’s Flow Library used to model
capacity-constrained processing locations that fill container entities with quantities of fluid.
Fillers deliver fluid that is drawn from a container object.
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Emptier
Emptier objects are another unique type of Server object from Simio’s Flow Library used to
model capacity-constrained processing locations that empty the flow contents of container
entities. Emptiers draw fluid from a container object and deliver it to another container
object via FlowConnector objects or Pipe objects.
Links
Link objects are fixed objects used to define a pathway between two nodes in a model that
can be traveled by an entity.
Sinks
Sink objects are from Simio’s Standard Library and are used to destroy entities that have
finished processing in themodel. Entity statistics are recorded as they exit the model through
a sink.
Transfer Nodes
Transfer nodes are robust objects that allow for paths to be connected as well as the ability
to select a specific destination, path, or transfer device.
3.2 Simio Model of Port Refueling Operations
We build upon the standard Simio model objects described above to develop a simulation
model for port refueling operations. We develop a Baseline Model of a port that consists of a
single channel entrance, berth (e.g., pier), fuel tank, and pipeline connecting the tank to the
berth (Figure 3.1). Our Baseline Model uses model objects from both Standard and Flow
Libraries in Simio with parameters and relationships that reflect the structure and function
of a realistic port.
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Figure 3.1. Baseline Model of Port Refueling Operations. A basic port con-
sisting of a single refueling berth supplied by a single fuel storage tank is cre-
ated using objects from Simio’s Standard Library and Flow Library. During
simulation, system flow is from left to right. (ℎ8? and )0=:4A entities enter
the system via AA8{8=(ℎ8?B and AA8{8=)0=:4AB source objects. Each
entity is routed through the ℎ0==4;=CA0=24 server prior to entering the
port. Upon entering the port, (ℎ8?B are routed to the 4ACℎ8;;4A to receive
fuel from )0=:1 and )0=:4AB are routed to the 4ACℎ<?C84A to deliver
fuel to )0=:1. Once fuel filling or emptying processes complete, (ℎ8? and
)0=:4A entities exit the port via sinks G8C8=(ℎ8?B and G8C8=)0=:4AB,
respectively. Only a single ship may be within the berth (grey region) at
any time, such that (ℎ8?B cannot receive fuel while )0=:4AB deliver fuel to
)0=:1, and vice versa.
3.2.1 Port Model Objects
We provide a detailed description of each component in the port model and their parameters
for simulation. Note: Our Baseline Model provides a framework for studying multiple port
configurations. To emphasize model flexibility, we only define parameter values for those
necessary to capture realistic port operations for refueling military ships. We also indicate
model parameters that must be set by the model user prior to analysis.
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Port Entities
Our port model has two entity objects: (ℎ8?B and )0=:4AB. Ships are ContainerEntity
objects representing guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) arriving for refueling at the port.
Ship containers represent the quantity of fuel on the ship in its fuel tank. The fuel level of
each Ship is determined upon its creation at the source. Once Ships are created, they are
routed to the port channel entrance represented by a Server object. Once a Ship can enter
the port, it will access one of the port’s fueling berths, where its fuel tank is filled from the
port’s fuel storage via a Filler object. Ships exit the system via a Ship-specific Sink object.
Ships have several key parameters that dictate their needs for refueling during simulation
runs:
• Capacity: The maximum volume of fuel that can be stored in each Ship entity’s
container. We set this value to be 420,000 gallons to represent the fuel tank size of a
DDG.
• Initial Volume: The volume of fuel that a Ship has in its container upon arrival to the
port. We set the incoming fuel level to be a random sample chosen from the triangular
distribution with a minimum of 45% full, mode of 65% full, and maximum of 85%
full.
• Speed: The physical speed of the Ship. We set this to be 10 nautical miles per hour
based on the recommended ship speed assumptions for a narrow channel (Department
of Defense 2010b, p. 52).
• Priority: The priority value for entities arriving at the port channel entrance. We
assign Ship priority as low to ensure that other entities arriving at the port receive
priority.
Tankers are ContainerEntity objects representing ships arriving to replenish the port’s fuel
storage tanks (e.g., an oil barge). Similar to Ships, Tanker fuel capacity and fuel level are
variable and determined upon entity creation. Also like Ships, Tankers are routed to the
channel entrance (Server). Then, Tankers are routed to one of the port’s fueling berths where
its contents are discharged into the fuel storage tanks via an Emptier object. Tankers leave
the system via a Tanker-specific Sink object.
There are several key parameters for Tanker entities that dictate their ability to replenish
port tanks during simulation runs:
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• Capacity: The maximum volume of fuel that can be stored in each Tanker entity. We
set this value to be 2,940,000 gallons (70,000 barrels) to represent a small general
purpose tanker similar to ones that are typically used to transport refined petroleum
products to Indo-Pacific ports.
• Initial Volume: The volume of fuel that a tanker has upon arrival to the port. We set
this value to be 2,940,000 gallons to represent a full tanker arriving to the port.
• Speed: The physical speed of the tanker. We set this to be 10 nautical miles per hour
based on the recommended ship speed assumptions for a narrow channel (Department
of Defense 2010b, p. 52).
• Priority: The priority value for entities of this type. We assign Tankers a higher
priority than Ships to ensure that precedence is given to replenishing fuel at the port
over Ships receiving fuel from the port.
Port Sources
Our port model has two sources, AA8{8=(ℎ8?B and AA8{8=)0=:4AB, related to the
generation of (ℎ8? and )0=:4A entities, respectively. The ArrivingShips source generates
all Ships arriving into the port system. We set several key parameters for ArrivingShips that
set the Ship entity arrival pattern:
• Entities per Arrival: This parameter determines howmany Ship entities are generated
in a given arrival. Specifically, Ships arrive in groups representing a surface action
group (SAG) of DDGs. We set the size of the SAG to be a random sample from a
uniform distribution of two to five ships per arrival.
• Interarrival Time: This parameter represents the time between each arrival generated
by the Source object. We assign this to be a random sample from the exponential dis-
tribution to model a Poisson process. We use a Poisson process to model independent
SAG arrivals as well as incorporate high variability in order to stress test our system.
The mean of the exponential distribution is a parameter that can be set by the user by
using the property ShipArrivalRate.
ArrivingTankers is the Source object that generates all arriving Tanker entities that resupply
the port’s fuel tanks. Tankers have a different arrival pattern than Ships defined by the
following parameters:
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• Interarrival Time: Time between each tanker arrival generated by the Source object.
Whereaswe assume Ship entities arrive based on a Poisson process, we assumeTanker
entities arrive based on a set or planned replenishment pattern. Specifically, we assume
the ArrivingTanker interarrival time to be the mean number of days between Tanker
arrivals. This is set in the model using the property TankerArrivalRate.
• Entities per Arrival: We set this value to one to represent a single tanker arriving to
the port.
Port Servers
The Baseline Port Model only has a single server, ℎ0==4;=CA0=24. ChannelEntrance
is a server that represents a queue for ships to wait outside the port until a refueling berth
is available. This simulates real port operations as most ports have limited space for ship
entry and exit. There are several parameters that determine the functioning of the Port
ChannelEntrance:
• Initial Capacity: The ChannelEntrance is a Server with an intial processing capacity
of one.
• Maximum Queue Size: We model a maximum of five Ships waiting in the queue to
be refueled by setting the output buffer capacity of ChannelEntrance to one, its initial
processing capacity to one, and its input buffer capacity to three.
• Processing Time: We set the processing time to be zero, as this is not a physical
processing location; it is simply a holding location for ships to wait for an available
refueling berth.
• Balking Options: A ship that arrives when there are already five ships in the queue
will balk and decide not to enter the ChannelEntrance. This represents a Ship entity
needing to travel to different location to receive fuel. The entity is sent to the Ship
Sink so that statistics can still be recorded about the unmet demand.
• Reneging Options: A ship will wait at the output buffer for a maximum of six hours
before they will abandon waiting in the buffer. This ensures that the system will not
jam when the port runs out of fuel and that an arriving tanker can get through the
channel to replenish the port.
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Port Tanks
Our Baseline Port Model only has a single fuel storage tank, )0=:1, represented by a tank
object. Tanks have several key parameters that dictate their ability to receive and deliver
fuel:
• Tank Capacity: The total volume capacity of the fuel storage tank. We set this value
to be 1,000,000 gallons for our Baseline Port Model.
• Initial Tank Contents:We set the tank to be full at the start of the simulation run.
• Tank Input Flow Rate: We set the flow rate into the tank to be 7,000 gallons per
minute which is the recommended design flow rate between a regular tanker and fuel
storage (Department of Defense 2020, p. 16).
• Tank Output Flow Rate: We set the flow rate to be 1,400 gallons per minute which
is the recommended design flow rate from fuel storage to DDGs (Department of
Defense 2020, p. 17).
Port Fillers
Our Baseline Port Model only has a single filler, 4ACℎ8;;4A, that pumps contents from
the port’s fuel storage tank into the container (fuel tank) of an arriving ship. We set the
following parameters to dictate the filler’s behavior while refueling ships:
• Flow Rate: We set the flow rate to be 1,400 gallons per minute which is the recom-
mended design flow rate from fuel storage to DDGs (Department of Defense 2020,
p. 17).
• Stop Early Trigger: We implement a stop early trigger that causes a refueling ship to
exit the system early if the port’s fuel storage tanks become empty.
Port Emptiers
Our Baseline Port Model only has a single emptier, 4ACℎ<?C84A, that pumps contents
from an arriving tanker into the port’s fuel storage tanks. We set the following parameters
to dictate the emptier’s behavior while refilling tanks:
• Flow Rate: We set the flow rate to be 7,000 gallons per minute which is the recom-
mended design flow rate between a regular tanker and fuel storage (Department of
Defense 2020, p. 16).
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• Stop Early Trigger:We implement a stop early trigger that causes an emptying tanker
to exit the system early if the port’s fuel storage tank becomes full.
Port Links
Our port model uses the path, ℎ0==4;, to represent the channel on which arriving ships
and tankers travel to the refueling berth. Several key parameters dictate the characteristic
and functionality of the channel:
• Logical Length: We set the physical length of the channel to be 0.5 nautical miles.
• Traveler Capacity: The maximum number of traveling entities that are allowed on the
Path object simultaneously. We set this value to one to represent a narrow channel on
which only one ship can travel at a time.
• Speed Limit: The maximum speed at which an entity can travel along the path. We
set this to be 10 nautical miles per hour based on the recommended ship speed
assumptions for a narrow channel (Department of Defense 2010b, p. 52).
OurBaseline PortModel has two additional paths, 4ACℎ8;;4A%0CℎB and 4ACℎ<?C84A%0Cℎ,
used to route incoming ships and tankers to the appropriate object type inside the berth.
The following parameter governs this decision behavior:
• Link Selection Weight: We assign the selection weights of the links connecting the
channel to the BerthFiller and BerthEmptier to be a logical expression based on
the traversing entity’s priority. Only entities with a priority equal to two (ships) can
travel the to the BerthFiller object, whereas only entities with a priority equal to one
(tankers) can travel to the BerthEmptier object.
Our Baseline Port Model uses two FlowConnector objects, 8;;4A%8?4 and <?C84A%8?4,
which are used to represent the pipes connecting from the refueling berth to the fuel storage
tank.
Port Sinks
Our port model uses two sinks, G8C8=(ℎ8?B and G8C8=)0=:4AB, through which all ships
and tankers exit the system, respectively.
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3.2.2 Simulation of Port Operations
In this section, we describe the way we use the simulation framework to perform model
analysis on our Baseline Model. We describe the factors that remain constant throughout
each simulation run which represent the port’s configuration. We describe the independent
variables that we adjust over the course of multiple simulation runs in order to understand
the port’s performance. We describe primary measures of effectiveness and present sample
model output that we will use to analyze port performance.
Model Parameters:
There are a number of factors in our Baseline Model that can be configured. Each of these
factors can be either parameters that remain the same for each simulation run, or variables
that we adjust between simulation runs. The following factors we choose to keep constant
as parameters for each Simio experiment:
• Tanker Interarrival Time: We assume that Tanker entities have a set arrival time
schedule of 7 days for all simulation runs.
• Number / Capacity of Fuel Storage Tanks: There is a single fuel storage tank with a
total capacity of 1,000,000 gallons.
• Number of Berths: There is a single berth that is capable of both delivering fuel to a
ship and receiving fuel from a tanker. The berth has the capacity to serve one vessel
at a time.
• Piping and Pumping System Configuration: There is a single main fuel pipeline
connecting the fuel storage tanks to the berth. There is sufficient fuel pumping capacity
to provide the design flow rates from Department of Defense (2020, p. 17) of 1,400
gallons per minute from the fuel storage tank to a ship at the berth and 7,000 gallons
per minute from a tanker at the berth to the fuel storage tank.
• Number / Length of Channels: There is a single channel with a length of 0.5 nautical
miles connecting the channel entrance to the port’s single berthing location. The
channel supports one vessel travelling in each direction at a time at any given time.
Measures of Performance:
The primary measure of performance (MOP) that we use to understand the run and assess
the port’s performance is the percentage of the incoming demand that the port fulfills. To
34
estimate this value, we measure the percentage of incoming fuel demand that the port is
able to fulfill over the course of the entire simulation run:







where FDS=C4A8= is the fuel demand for Ship entities entering the Baseline Model system
from the ArrivingShips Source and FDSG8C8= is the fuel demand for Ship entities exiting
the Baseline Model system at the ExitingShips Sink. The sum for both parameters in
Equation 3.1 is taken for all entities entering and exiting during a user-defined time period.
Equation 3.1 results in a scaled values from 0 to 100 representing no demand met to all
demand met over the user-defined time period, respectively.
Simulation Variables:
To test the ability of the Baseline Port Model to serve different operational environments,
we adjust the SAG Interarrival Time to create two main scenarios that we use to test each
series of experiments. We call those scenarios “Non-Wartime” and “Wartime”, which we
define by setting the Interarrival Time parameter for the AA8{8=(ℎ8?B Source as follows:
• Non-Wartime Arrival: This arrival rate relates to normal port operations. We assume
the mean interarrival time for this scenario is six days.
• Wartime Arrival: This arrival rate relates to situations during wartime when more
SAGs will be arriving at the port. We assume the mean interarrival time for this
scenario is three days.
Example Simulation Run with Baseline Model:
Given the above system configuration, parameter settings, and measures of performance,
we simulate port operations with the Baseline Model in Figure 3.1. Each simulation run
consists of two periods: the warm-up period and the performance period.
We set a warm-up period of 540 days (approximately 18 months) to reduce startup bias.
Simulation models that implement queuing networks tend to have an initial-transient period
before the system reaches steady state, and allowing the model to have a warm-up period,
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during which no statistics are recorded, is a way to reduce startup bias caused by the initial-
transient period (Kelton et al. 2017, p. 95). We determined the length of the warm-up period
using a dynamic status plot in our simulation model, Figure 3.2, and observing the point at
which the output appeared to reach steady-state.
Figure 3.2. Simulation Warm-up Period. A warm-up period of 540 days is
used in order to allow the simulation model to reach steady-state before
recording any statistics, thereby reducing the impact of startup bias caused
by the initial transient period.
Once the warm-up period is completed, we simulate port operations 10 times to view
the variability in how well the Baseline Model serves different demand non-wartime and
wartime demand patterns. For each simulation, we measure the system performance using
Equation 3.1.Wemeasure thisMOP for different time periods representing different moving
averages after the warm-up period. Representative results of this analysis process can be
seen in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
Figure 3.3 presents the non-wartime fuel delivery performance of the port in terms of average
percent demand met. We can see that in the non-wartime conditions the port reaches steady-
state behavior by 60 days and is capable of meeting approximately 89% of the demand. In
Figure 3.4, we see that this figure drops to approximately 79% by 180 days in a wartime
situation.
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Figure 3.3. Simulation Run Output (Non-Wartime SAG Arrival). Percentage
of incoming fuel demand that the port is capable of meeting in a non-
wartime scenario. Steady-state performance in terms of percent demand met
is approximately 89% after 180 days. Note: The boxes encompass the 1BC
and 3A3 quartiles with a line drawn at the median separating them—the
mean value is represented by an “×”.
Figure 3.4. Simulation Run Output (Wartime SAG Arrival).Percentage of
incoming fuel demand that the port is capable of meeting in a wartime
scenario. The system does not appear to reach steady-state by 180 days
where the percent demand met is approximately 79%.
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3.3 Port Disruptions and Resilience Technologies
We build upon our Baseline Model to measure the benefits of resilience technologies being
developed by the USN. Before we are able to measure the benefits of resilience, we must
first introduce a way of representing disruptions in our port model.
3.3.1 Port Disruptions
Port disruptions are broad and can impact any part of the port system. Some specific
examples of port disruptions include:
• Blocked Channel: A blocked channel prevents entry into and exit from the port. This
can be caused due to improper port maintenance (e.g., dredging) preventing larger
ships from entering the port or due to ship failure in the channel blocking other ships
from entering and exiting.
• Disabled Berths: A disabled berth means that ships entering the port will be unable
to safely moor and connect to refueling equipment.
• Pipe Breaks: A pipe break prevents the flow of fuel from the fuel tank to the berth.
In this situation, ships are able to moor and fuel is available, but the fuel is unable to
reach the ship.
• Disabled Tank: A disabled tank means fuel stored at the port may be inaccessible.
This can be caused by broad issues like leaks and fires. In situations like leaks, tanks
need to be patched, and fuel in the tanks can be immediately used. In situations like
fires, once the fire is put out, the remaining fuel will need to be filtered prior to use.
While each of these port disruptions have different impacts on port and fuel access, in
general, they all cause the same impact on refueling operations in our model — Ships will
be unable to refuel and Tankers will be unable to replenish tanks. For representing these
effects, Simio has built-in functionality to represent disruptions by using Boolean properties
for model objects.
3.3.2 Resilience Technologies
Prior to this thesis, we held stakeholdermeetings to determine a set of resilience technologies
being developed in the USN. Table 3.1 presents a short list of five new and emerging
port resilience technologies identified by stakeholders. In this thesis, we study a subset
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of these technologies to identify their resilience benefits for the Baseline Model of ports.
Specifically, we assess the Navy Fuels Infrastructure Rapid Repair Solutions (NFIRRS)
developed by NAVFAC EXWC and the Seabased Petroleum Distribution System (SPDS)
under development by NAVSEA OPLOG.
Whilemodeling the impacts of disruptions is straightforward using our Baseline PortModel,
to consider the benefits of resilience technologies we must develop new model objects and
add them to our Baseline Model. For this reason, each technology (NFIRRS and SPDS) has
its own unique implementation that is an extension of our Baseline Model.
Navy Fuels Infrastructure Rapid Repair Solutions (NFIRRS) Model
As described in Table 3.1, NFIRRS can be understood as a containerized, deployable fuel
farm infrastructure recovery and repair kit that includes all necessary equipment that enable
the recovery of damaged fuel infrastructure. These tools and supplies are critical for fuel
infrastructure repair and are not likely to be readily available at a remote Indo-Pacific port.
Based on our discussions with NAVFAC EXWC, our assumption for a standard repair time
with and without NFIRRS is 1-day and 7-days, respectively.
To implement NFIRRS in our model, we use Simio’s add-on process control logic. An
add-on process is a method built into Simio to implement additional behavior that triggers
after an event occurs. Add-on processes are in addition to the standard logic of port objects
defined above.
Our implementation of NFIRRS uses the add-on process shown in Figure 3.5, when there
is a disruption (e.g., a broken pipe), the refueling berth is closed until the disruption is
repaired. If NFIRRS is available, the add-on process implements the rapid 1-day repair time
before reopening the berth. If NFIRRS is not available, the add-on process implements the
standard 7-day repair time before reopening the berth.
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Table 3.1. Existing and Novel Port Refueling Technologies in the USN.




Containerized, deployable fuel farm infrastruc-
ture recovery and repair kit. Includes pipe cut-
ters and diverters, valves, pump/filters, flexible
hose, clamps, joints, etc. to enable the recovery
of damaged fuel farm infrastructure.
Seabased Petroleum Distribu-
tion System (SPDS)
Submersible barge with pumps, hoses, and
power conduit from beachhead to barge 1–2
miles off-shore. Can be used as an alternative
fueling pier in conjunction with a single anchor
leg mooring buoy. Designed to be fully opera-
tional within 48 hours.
Offshore Support Vessels Commercial off-the-shelf vessels that have the
capability to store, transport, and distribute op-
erationally relevant quantities of fuel in the near
shore.
Resilient Expeditionary Agile
Littoral Logistics Joint Capa-
bility TechnologyDemonstra-
tion
A suite of capabilities to enable commercial
barges to operate as offshore logistics hubs in
support of expeditionary advanced base opera-
tions. Enables the capability to provide ship-to-
ship refueling, fuel-over-the-shore, and vertical
take-off and landing capability to refuel and re-
supply helicopters on deck.
Underground /HardenedStor-
age Tanks
Provides protection against missile strike and
other forms of kinetic attack.
Multi-functional Berths Multiple locations (berths) from which a fuel
tanker can replenish the fuel farm.
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Figure 3.5. Navy Fuels Infrastructure Rapid Repair Solutions Model. Our
NFIRRS Model is implemented using Simio’s add-on process control logic.
When there is a disruption (e.g., a broken pipe), the refueling berth is closed
until the disruption is repaired. If NFIRRS is available, the add-on process
implements the rapid 1-day repair time before reopening the berth. If NFIRRS
is not available, the add-on process implements the standard 7-day repair
time before reopening the berth.
Seabased Petroleum Distribution System (SPDS) Model
As described in Table 3.1, SPDS can be thought of as a submersible fuel barge that acts as
a replacement or additional berth that can be deployed inside and outside of ports. Using
our framework for port modeling, SPDS is a specialized model object consisting of a Tank,
Filler, Emptier, and Links representing SPDS specifications, access, and connectivity to
the original port system. The inclusion of these additional model objects into our Baseline
Model generates an SPDSmodel shown in Figure 3.6. Here, the Baseline Model is extended
to include an SPDS Tank, Filler, and Emptier shown in the upper portion of the figure. The
SPDS model objects act as an additional, independent berth from the original berth in our
Baseline Model. Thus, additional SPDS Link objects are included in the SPDS Model to
route and control Ship and Tanker flows to and from each berth.
Note: SPDS can be configured to connect into a port and re-route fuel flows via additional
pipelines shown in black on the right-hand portion of Figure 3.6. We show these additional
pipelines to demonstrate the full functionality of SPDS, but this SPDS configuration requires
additional time and is more difficult to implement after a port disruption. For this reason,
we do not include these additional pipelines and re-routing of fuel in our analysis.
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Figure 3.6. Seabased Petroleum Distribution System Model. Our SPDS
Model is an extension of our Baseline Port Model (see Figure 3.1) using
Port Model objects. Additional model objects in this model include the SPDS
Tank, Filler, and Emptier added above our the Baseline Model berth. These
model objects connect into the original port via SPDS Links to the left of
these objects that dictate Ship and Tanker entity flows to the SPDS. Ad-
ditional pipelines can also be added to allow the SPDS to connect into the
Baseline Model fuel tank and system. Although they are shown here on the
right hand side (black lines), we do not include the effects of these additional
pipelines in our analysis.
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We provide detailed description of each component in this port model that differs from
the port model introduced in the previous section. Unless otherwise noted below, the
components in this model function the same as the Baseline Port Model in Figure 3.1.
SPDS Tank
Our SPDS Model includes an additional tank, (%( )0=: , which represents the fuel
storage tank of the SPDS system. Several key parameters dictate the implementation and
functionality of SPDS:
• Tank Capacity: The total volume capacity of the SPDS fuel storage tank. We set this
value to be 600,000 gallons for our Baseline Port Model.
• Initial Tank Contents:We set the tank to be full at the start of the simulation run.
• Tank Input Flow Rate: We set this to be 1,000 gallons per minute which is the
recommended design flow rate to SPDS.
• Tank Output Flow Rate: We set this to be 1,000 gallons per minute which is the
recommended design flow rate from SPDS.
SPDS Filler
Our SPDS Model includes an additional filler, (%( 8;;4A, which represents the location
that an arriving ship entity will travel to in order to receive fuel from the SPDS tank. We
set the following parameters to dictate the filler’s behavior while refueling ships:
• Flow Rate: We set the flow rate to be 1,000 gallons per minute which is the design
flow rate for SPDS.
• Stop Early Trigger: We implement a stop early trigger that causes a refueling ship to
depart the SPDS system once its tank is filled.
SPDS Emptier
Our SPDS Model includes an additional emptier, (%( <?C84A, which represents the
location that an arriving tanker entity will travel to in order to deliver fuel to the SPDS tank.
We set the following parameters to dictate the emptier’s behavior while refilling the SPDS
tank:
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• Flow Rate: We set the flow rate to be 1,000 gallons per minute which is the design
flow rate for SPDS.
• Stop Early Triggers:We implement a stop early trigger that causes an emptying tanker
to depart the SPDS system once its tank becomes full.
SPDS Links
Our SPDS Model includes several path objects connecting the output of ChannelEntrance
to each filler and emptier object at the port’s berth and SPDS system. The way we implement
these path objects that represent the channel is one of the primary differences between the
SPDS Model and the Baseline Model. Each of these paths represent the same physical
location, and the path in the model that a particular ship or tanker will take is decided
by selection weights that are governed by carefully developed logical expressions. Those
expressions for each path are described below:
• ℎ0==4;=CA0=24 to 4ACℎ<?C84A Path Logic: Entities that travel this path must
only have a Priority equal to one (only tankers travel to an emptier). This path is also
only active when the Boolean state variable, 1_(|8C2ℎ, is True which serves as
a dynamic switch that can turn on/off the berth mid-execution. If the Boolean state
variable, (%(_(|8C2ℎ, is also True, there is logic on this path that ensures the
tanker first visits the SPDS system.
• ℎ0==4;=CA0=24 to 4ACℎ8;;4A Path Logic: Entities that travel this path must
only have a Priority equal to two (only ships travel to a filler). Other conditions that
must be met for this path to be viable are 1_(|8C2ℎmust be True, 1_+020=C must
be True, and the fuel storage tanks that serve the berth must not be empty.
• ℎ0==4;=CA0=24 to (%(<?C84A Path Logic: Entities that travel this path must
only have a Priority equal to one (only tankers travel to an emptier). Other condi-
tions that must be met for this path to be viable are (%(_(|8C2ℎ must be True,
(%(_+020=C must be True, and the tanker must not have already traveled to the
SPDS system.
• ℎ0==4;=CA0=24 to (%(8;;4A Path Logic:Entities that travel this pathmust only
have a Priority equal to two (only ships travel to a filler). Other conditions that must
be met for this path to be viable are (%(_(|8C2ℎ must be True, (%(_+020=C
must be True, and the SPDS tank must not be empty.
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• (%(<?C84A to ℎ0==4;=CA0=24 Path Logic: This path will be selected if the
refueling berth is open causing the tanker to replenish the port’s fuel supply after
visiting the SPDS system.
• (%(_<?C84A to G8C8=)0=:4AB Path Logic: This path is selected if SPDS is
the only source of fuel in the port. Tankers will exit the system after replenishing the
SPDS tank.
3.4 Port Disruption and Resilience Analysis
We define a set of simulation experiments to test the impacts of port disruptions and
resilience technologies. We build on the model parameters, measure of performance, and
simulation variables from as the BaselineModel with additions relevant for port disruptions,
the NFIRRS Model, and the SPDS Model.
3.4.1 Model Parameters
Where possible, disruption and resilience models use the same parameters as the Baseline
Model.We also implement the following parameters to include port disruptions in simulation
runs:
• A40:%8?4 — When set to True, this option introduces a disruption that approxi-
mates a break in the fuel pipe that delivers fuel to the port’s berth. Fuel delivery to
the berth is not possible until the fuel pipe is repaired. The repair time depends on
whether or not NFIRRS is available; if so, the repair time is 1-day, otherwise, the
standard repair time without NFIRRS is set to be 7-days.
• 8B01;4)0=: —When set to True, this option introduces long-term disruption that
approximates a disabled fuel tank that is not capable of being repaired quickly. In a
configuration such as our Baseline Port Model, in which there is only one fuel storage
tank, fuel delivery at the berth is no longer possible.
We also define a Disruption Day parameter for model simulations that determines when
disruptions occur. For our analysis, we set this to be the same day as the length of the
warm-up period (540 days) to represent a disruption occurring at time ) = 0 relative to a
simulation run.
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3.4.2 Measure of Performance
We use the same measure of performance as Equation 3.1. However, we now measure
performance for time windows relative to the onset of port disruptions (i.e., the Disruption
Day parameter). We adjust the length of each run of the simulation by setting the ‘Run
Length’ accordingly. Together with post-disruption statistics (defined below), we are able to
observe the cumulative and lasting effects that a disruption has on the average performance
of the port.
We also assess the relative impacts of a port disruptions with and without resilience tech-









Here, % Demand Met#
{
is the mean percent of fuel demand met from 10 simulations of a
no disruption scenario and % Demand Met'(
{
is the mean percent demand met for 10 simu-
lation of a disruption scenario with and without resilience technologies. Performance'( ≤ 0
measures the expected relative impacts of disruptions, where values closer to 0 indicate low
impact on port operations and more resilience. Performance'( > 0 also captures rare cases
where port disruptions and/or resilience technologies may improve port operations above
those normally expected performance.
3.4.3 Simulation Variables
Port disruption and resilience models use the same simulation variables as the Baseline
Model for Ship entity arrivals during non-wartime and wartime conditions. We also define
several variables related to the model we choose during a simulation run to account for
situations with and without resilience technologies. For setting up Simio experiments, we
define the following variables:
• Resilience Technology: The type of resilience technology that is available at the port
that can be implemented in response to a disruption is selected using a Boolean vari-
able that activates a particular type of resilience technology. The resilience technology
options are:
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• SPDS Available:When set to True, this option enables the implementation of SPDS
following a disruption event. This activates an additional refueling with a dedicated
underwater fuel storage tank with a capacity of 600,000 gallons. The setup time for
SPDS is 48 hours following the disruption.
• NFIRRS Available: When set to True, this option enables the implementation of
NFIRRS following a disruption event. This reduces the repair time following a dam-
aged pipe from 7-days to 1-day.
Using these parameters, MOP, and variables, we are able to assess the impact of port
disruptions and the benefits of resilience technologies. We present these results in the
next chapter and compare these simulations to the Baseline Model simulations without
disruptions (Figures 3.3 and 3.4).
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In this chapter, we analyze the impact that port disruptions have under a normal scenario 
and a wartime scenario for our Baseline Model. We then implement resilience technologies, 
specifically NFIRRS and SPDS, under the same conditions to assess the benefits that they 
provide in terms of overall port performance.
4.1 Impacts of Disruptions and Resilience Technologies
In this section, we begin by analyzing the performance of the port subject to a disruption. 
We then implement resilience technologies (NFIRRS and SPDS) to assess their effect on 
the port’s ability to meet incoming fuel demand. Finally, we conclude by comparing the 
two resilience technologies and determining the situations in which one technology might 
be better than the other.
4.1.1 Normal port disruption
During the non-wartime scenario shown in Figure 4.1, for the 14-day time window, compared 
to the non-disrupted case, we see the impact of a disruption having up to a 44.2% drop 
in mean percent demand met, with a 95% confidence interval (CI) of (40.9, 47.5). The 
impact is most pronounced at the shorter time-windows and the average port performance 
steadily improves when looking at post disruption time-windows of increasing size. 
However, even compared to the non-disrupted scenario at 180 days, the port is never able 
to reach the average port performance, still showing a 4.4% drop in performance, with a 
95% CI of (2.0, 6.8).
For the wartime scenario depicted in Figure 4.2, we see very similar results to the non-
wartime scenario. There is a greater impact seen at the 14 day time-window with a 49.0%
drop in percent demand met, with a 95% CI of (44.9, 53.0). As in the non-wartime case, 
things steadily improve over time; however, even compared to the non-disrupted scenario 
at 180 days, there is still a 4.1% drop in performance, with a 95% CI of (1.5, 6.7).
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Figure 4.1. Disruption Impact (Non-Wartime SAG Arrival Rate). The impact
of a disruption repaired in 7 days (orange) is compared against no disruption
(blue). The result is up to a 44.2% drop in the port’s ability to meet the
incoming fuel demand (14-day time window), with a 95% CI of (40.9, 47.5).
The cumulative effects of this 7-day disruption on average port performance
last for over six months after the disruption.
Figure 4.2. Disruption Impact (Wartime SAG Arrival Rate). The impact
of a disruption that is repaired in 7 days (orange) is compared against no
disruption (blue). The result is up to a 49.0% drop in the port’s ability to
meet the incoming fuel demand (14-day time window), with a 95% CI of
(44.9, 53.0). Additionally, the cumulative effects of this 7-day disruption on
average port performance last for over six months after the disruption.
50
4.1.2 Benefits of NFIRRS
We now assess the benefits that NFIRRS provides by examining port performance under
the same non-wartime and wartime scenarios. We assume that NFIRRS provides a 1-day
repair time (versus the normal 7-days), and we assume that NFIRRS restores the port to
pre-disruption conditions.
For the non-wartime scenario shown in Figure 4.3,we see thatNFIRRSprovides a significant
improvement over the normal 7-day repair time case in terms of reduced impact of the
disruption as well as faster recovery to pre-disruption levels of average cumulative port
performance. Again, we see the maximum impact on cumulative average port performance
when looking at the 14-day post-disruption time window; however, this drop is only 8.0%,
with a 95% CI of (3.9, 12.1), compared to the 44.2% drop seen with the normal 7-day repair
time. By 30 days, we only see a 2.2% drop in percent demand met, with a 95% CI of (-0.9,
5.3), compared to the non-disrupted case, and by 180 days it is down to just 0.5%, with a
95% CI of (-1.8, 2.8). We see that having the faster repair time provided by NFIRRS allows
the port to rebound quickly and perform essentially the same as in the non-disrupted case.
Likewise, the cumulative impacts on average port performance over time are drastically
reduced or even eliminated.
For the wartime scenario depicted in Figure 4.4, we see that NFIRRS offers significant
improvement across the board when compared to the normal 7-day repair time case in terms
of average cumulative port performance. We see that NFIRRS roughly cuts the impact
on percent of fuel demand met in half at every post-disruption time window. By 180 days,
cumulative average port performance iswithin 1.9%of the performance of the non-disrupted
port, with a 95% CI of (-0.8, 4.7).
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Figure 4.3. Benefits of NFIRRS (Non-Wartime SAG Arrival Rate). The im-
pact of NFIRRS (gray) is compared to a 7-day repair time (orange) as well
as a port with no disruption (blue) in a non-wartime scenario. Here, NFIRRS
provides significant reduction in the impact of the disruption as well a fast
recovery to pre-disruption performance levels.
Figure 4.4. Benefits of NFIRRS (Wartime SAG Arrival Rate). The impact
of NFIRRS (gray) is compared to a 7-day repair time (orange) as well as a
port with no disruption (blue) in a wartime scenario. Here, NFIRRS cuts the
drop in average percent demand met roughly in half at every post-disruption
time window.
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4.1.3 Benefits of SPDS
We now assess the benefits that SPDS provides by examining port performance under the
same non-wartime and wartime scenarios. We assume that SPDS is setup and available 48
hours after the disruption, and we assume that the 600,000 gallon SPDS fuel tank is full
when SPDS is setup and ready for use. We assess the performance of SPDS under two
situations: 1) SPDS without repair of the original disruption over the entire 180 days, and
2) SPDS in conjunction with the normal 7-day repair time of the disruption.
SPDS without Repair
In this situation, we assume that the disruption to the port is never repaired within the 180
days, the port’s refueling berth is not re-opened, and that all ships are refueled at the SPDS
system that is made available within 48 hours after the disruption.
For the non-wartime scenario shown in Figure 4.5, we see that SPDS without repair offers
considerable reduction in impact due to the disruption even when compared to the normal
repair case for time windows 30 days and below. For the 14-day time window, we see a
17.7% drop in average percent demand met, with a 95% CI of (14.1, 21.3), compared to the
44.2% drop seen in the normal repair scenario. For the 30-day window, we see a 13.4% drop
in average percent demand met, with a 95% CI of (10.2, 16.6), compared to a 24.2% drop.
However, beyond 30 days, we see the percent demand met of this system plateau at levels
approximately 12.7% below the non-disrupted case, with a 95% CI of (9.3, 16.2)—this
is due to the fact that the port is now operating with a reduced fuel storage capacity and
reduced fuel delivery rates. Though in this case, it demonstrates the benefit that SPDS can
offer in situations in which timely port repair is not possible, allowing the port to provide
sustained, but limited, performance.
For the wartime scenario depicted in Figure 4.6, again we see that SPDS without repair
offers improvement in the short-term in terms of reduction in impact due to the disruption;
however, in this case the benefit of over the normal repair case is no longer present at 30 days
and beyond. Here we see the performance of this system plateau at levels approximately
17.5% below those of the non-disrupted port, with a 95% CI of (15.3, 19.7).
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Figure 4.5. Benefits of SPDS without Repair (Non-Wartime SAG Arrival).
The impact of SPDS without repair (yellow) is compared to a 7-day repair
time (orange) as well as no disruption (blue) in a non-wartime scenario.
SPDS provides a reduction in the impact of the disruption for the short-
term (14 days and 30 days). Beyond 30 days, we see system performance
plateau at 12.7% below the non-disrupted case, with a 95% CI of (9.3, 16.2).
Figure 4.6. Benefits of SPDS without Repair (Wartime SAG Arrival). The
impact of SPDS without repair (yellow) is compared to a 7-day repair time
(orange) as well as a port with no disruption (blue) in a wartime scenario.
SPDS provides a benefit over the normal repair case in the 14 day window.
System performance plateaus at levels approximately 17.5% below that of
the non-disrupted port, with a 95% CI of (15.3, 19.7).
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SPDS with Normal 7-day Repair
In this situation, we assume that the disruption to the port is repaired after 7 days and that 
the port’s refueling operations return to pre-disruption conditions with the additional benefit 
of having SPDS implemented at the port.
For the non-wartime scenario shown in Figure 4.7, we see that SPDS with repair offers 
considerable recovery in the short-term (14 day time window) when compared to the non-
disrupted case, with only an 11.9% drop in average percent demand met, with a 95% 
CI of (-0.8, 4.7); this is compared to the 44.2% drop that is seen in the 7-day repair 
case without SPDS. For time windows of 30 days and above, the SPDS with repair case 
actually outperforms the non-disrupted port. By 180 days, this configuration of the port 
actually provides a 5.2% increase in percent demand met over the non-disrupted port, 
with a 95%CI of (5.6, 10.4).
For the wartime scenario depicted in Figure 4.8, again we see that SPDS with repair offers 
improvement in the very short-term (14 day time window) in terms of average percent 
demand met when compared against the normal repair case. In this scenario, we start to see 
the benefits of the additional port capacity by the 90 day mark, which is the time window 
that this configuration starts to outperform even the non-disrupted port. By 180 days, this 
configuration outperforms the non-disrupted case by 8.0%.
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Figure 4.7. Benefits of SPDS with Repair (Non-Wartime SAG Arrival). The
impact of SPDS with repair (light-blue) is compared to a 7-day repair time
(orange) as well as a port with no disruption (blue) in a non-wartime scenario.
Here, SPDS provides quick recovery as well as improved performance even
over the non-disrupted port.
Figure 4.8. Benefits of SPDS with Repair (Wartime SAG Arrival). The impact
of SPDS with repair (light-blue) is compared to a 7-day repair time (orange)
as well as a port with no disruption (blue) in a wartime scenario. Here,
SPDS provides quick recovery as well as improved performance even over
the non-disrupted port.
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4.2 Comparison of Resilience Technologies
In this section we compare the results that were obtained individually in the previous sec-
tions, this time looking at the average benefits of each technology relative to no-disruption.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the percent change inmean performance relative to the no-disruption
scenario (Equation 3.2). From these tables we see that NFIRRS and SPDS are both capable
of providing resilience to ports experiencing disruption of this kind. However, we find that
each technology provides resilience in its own unique way that can be characterized into
one of the four categories of resilience: 1) robustness, 2) rebound, 3) extensibility and 4)
adaptability (Woods 2015).
Table 4.1. Percent Demand Met Relative to No Disruption (Non-Wartime).
Scenario 14 days 30 days 60 days 90 days 120 days 180 days
Normal Repair -50.9% -28.6% -16.2% -10.1% -7.8% -4.9%
NFIRRS Repair -9.3% -2.6% -1.7% -1.4% -0.9% -0.6%
SPDS + No Repair -20.4% -15.8% -17.8% -15.8% -13.8% -14.1%
SPDS + Repair -13.7% 3.4% 0.2% 3.7% 5.6% 5.8%
In a non-wartime scenario, we see that NFIRRS provides fast restoration and rebound to the
system. Here, we see that NFIRRS nearly eliminates the impact that the disruption has on
port refueling operations. By 30 days, the cumulative impact of the disruption on average
port performance is only 2.6% lower than the non-disrupted case, and by 180 days, that
reduces to a 0.6% drop in performance. SPDS without repair offers some recovery in the
form of adaptability, resulting in operations being shifted to a completely different system,
but we see that SPDS alone ultimately results in a 14.1% drop in performance by 180 days
due to the port having a reduced capacity when compared to its original configuration.
Finally, we see that SPDS plus repair not only provides an immediate benefit, with only
a 13.7% drop in performance at 14 days, but it also results in a system that eventually
outperforms the original system, resulting a 5.8% increase in performance relative to the
non-disrupted port. This is an extensibility approach to resilience, as the original disruption
is repaired in conjunction with the deployment of a new system.
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Table 4.2. Percent Demand Met Relative to No Disruption (Wartime).
Scenario 14 days 30 days 60 days 90 days 120 days 180 days
Normal Repair -55.6% -30.3% -16.4% -10.9% -8.3% -5.2%
NFIRRS Repair -29.1% -15.7% -8.2% -5.4% -3.9% -2.4%
SPDS + No Repair -25.0% -28.0% -28.7% -23.5% -24.6% -22.1%
SPDS + Repair -19.4% -30.4% -5.2% 3.9% 6.4% 10.1%
We see similar results, with some key differences, in our analysis of the wartime scenario
in Table 4.2. Here, NFIRRS continues to provide timely rebound for the system in the
medium to long term time windows; however, in the immediate near-term (14 days), it is
outperformed by the other resilience technologies. We see that in wartime SPDS without
repair maintains its ability to offer continued but limited port refueling capability, resulting
in performance that is approximately 22–25% below non-disrupted levels. And again, SPDS
with repair manages to provide immediate benefit, while also resulting better port refueling
operations in the long term, or 10.1% above non-disrupted performance at 180 days.
Neither resilience technology performs conclusively better than the other in each case;
instead, they both offer unique benefits depending on the scenario. An example of this is the
wartime scenario in which NFIRRS is outperformed by both implementations of SPDS in
the 14-day time frame; however, NFIRRS then outperforms SPDS during the 30-day time
frame. This result is attributed to the additional system complexity that comes with SPDS,
which results in a new system configuration that is more complex to manage and one that
takes longer to reach steady-state. In this case, NFIRRS does not provide the same long
term benefits as that of SPDS with repair. However, if naval operations are depending on a




Ports in the Indo-Pacific region provide critical refueling capabilities to our fleet that
enable uninterrupted military operations and power projection throughout the region. In a
future conflict with a near-peer adversary like China or Russia, these critical ports present
tempting targets, making them highly vulnerable. There are many different technologies
in development across several organizations within the USN that augment the resilience
of port refueling infrastructure; however, there is not enough work being done to compare
these technologies to better understand when and where certain technologies should be used
instead of another.
5.1 Thesis Summary
The first task of this thesis was to develop a framework for assessing port refueling oper-
ations. We chose to use discrete event simulation due to the complexity and the dynamic
nature of port refueling operations, especially when given disruptions. We used Simio to
develop the discrete event simulation using objects from Simio’s Standard and Flow li-
braries—using a combination of container entities, emptiers, fillers, and tanks combined
with complex routing logic and add-on processes, we developed a framework that allows us
to model any commercial or non-commercial port. We use these pieces to model a simple
port consisting of a single channel entrance, single refueling berth, and a single fuel storage
tank. We analyze this simple port’s refueling operations in a permissive (non-wartime) and
wartime environment in order to better understand the impacts each situation has on average
port performance over time. Our wartime scenario is modeled as a surge in SAG arrivals,
representing an increased war effort or war activity in the region where the port is located.
The other benefit of this framework is that it not only allows us to just study how ports
work, but it also allows us to study the impact that disruptions have on port operations.
We study the impact of a simple port disruption lasting 7 days—we expect this disruption
period to be consistent with a typical Indo-Pacific port disruption given the scarcity of
equipment and repair supplies in the region. Results for this simple port disruption led to
near-term and long-term impacts on refueling operations. The results show that even in
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a non-wartime scenario, the 7-day disruption can lead to a significant reduction in total
demand met for refueling operations over the first few weeks following a disruption, and
although the effect on refueling operations is short, we see a long-term impact on the
average refueling performance—resulting in periods of 4–6 months before getting back to
pre-disruption average performance levels.
We find the technologies developed by NAVFAC EXWC and NAVSEA OPLOG to be
capable of providing resilience to ports experiencing disruption of this kind. Resilience
as described earlier in this thesis is characterized in four different ways: 1) robustness,
2) rebound, 3) extensibility and 4) adaptability (Woods 2015). Each resilience technology
scenario emphasizes a different kind of resilience. NFIRRS provides fast restoration or
rebound to the system. In a non-wartime scenario, NFIRRS nearly eliminates the impact
that the disruption has on port refueling operations. However, during our wartime scenario
with a surge in arriving ships, NFIRRS appears to be less efficient in the immediate near-term
and long-term compared to other resilience technologies.
In contrast, SPDS without repair offers an adaptability approach to resilience, resulting in
operations being shifted to an entirely new system. We see that this does reduce the overall
impact of the disruption, but it leads to a long term drop in performance due to the port
having reduced capacity compared to the original port configuration.
Finally, SPDS with repair offers an extensibility approach to resilience, where the port
disruption is repaired in conjunction with the deployment of the new system. This config-
uration not only provides immediate benefit in response to a disruption, but it also leads to
better port operations in the long term.
It is important to note that neither technology, NFIRRS or SPDS, was better than the
other; instead, they offered unique benefits over the other in specific scenarios. For exam-
ple, NFIRRS (rebound) did not outperform either implementation of SPDS (extensibility
and adaptability) in the 14-day time frame during a wartime scenario. However, NFIRRS
outperforms both implementations of SPDS during the 30-day time frame in the same
wartime scenario. This is due the fact that the extensibility and adaptability options result
in new system configurations that are more complex to manage and take longer to reach
steady-state than the original port configuration. NFIRRS does not provide the same long
term benefits as that of SPDS with repair. However, if naval operations are depending on a
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30-day planning window, NFIRRS might offer the greatest benefit.
Overall, we recommend that the Navy invests in both NFIRRS and SPDS. NFIRRS is easy
to deploy and relatively low cost compared to SPDS, and NFIRRS is best suited for non-
wartime scenarios and ports that we don’t anticipate requiring additional support during
wartime. In contrast, SPDS with repair provides new capacity to extend operations in the
long term which leads to better port operations for smaller ports that may need additional
capacity during wartime. On its own, SPDS without repair can help manage and mitigate
the impacts of disruptions even when timely port repair efforts are not possible. Deploying
SPDS in regions that we anticipate the need for wartime refueling efforts is a critical next
step.
5.2 Limitations and Areas for Future Work
This thesis only studied NFIRRS and SPDS, but there are at least 3 other resilience tech-
nologies mentioned in Table 3.1 that we did not study. Stakeholder elicitation identified
upwards of 24 more technologies related to naval distributed refueling being developed
by various organizations within the USN not mentioned here. Although some of these are
suited for aircraft refueling, many of them might also offer resilience solutions for port
refueling operations. Before the Navy commits to making large investments in the two tech-
nologies that we studied, we recommend that models are developed that implement these
other applicable technologies.
Wemeasured the benefits of NFIRRS and SPDS using a simple port configuration consisting
of one refueling berth, one fuel storage tank, one primary fuel pipe, and a single channel
entrance to the port. Future work could apply the framework developed in this thesis to
model the true configuration of an actual port in the Indo-Pacific region. We anticipate
actual ports to have a more complex fuel piping system and multiple fuel storage tanks that
could change the need or deployment of resilience technologies because the potential for
disruption could be much lower due to the higher reliability and presence of more backup
systems.
This research did not consider the combined effects of multiple resilience technologies
(e.g., a port with both NFIRRS and SPDS available). We anticipate the results of combined
technologies to be even better in terms of port performance than those provided by the
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technologies individually, but if more than two technologies were modeled, future work
could explore the optimal combination of technologies for managing and responding to port
disruptions.
Future work could consider technologies that improve port resilience via robustness. Al-
though the technologies that we studied in this thesis mainly provided rebound, extensibility,
and adaptability forms of resilience, there has been significant work on the hardening and
protection of critical port refueling infrastructure. Including the effects of robustness tech-
nologies, such as underground or hardened fuel tanks, would be beneficial for understanding
cost benefit of NFIRRS and SPDS against other forms of mitigation.
Future extensions of our framework could be adapted to implement aircraft refueling opera-
tions and the respective resilience technologies that are in development for aircraft refueling.
This adaptation would utilize many of the same modeling objects as used in our port model
due to the analogous nature of the two activities—both systems involve arriving entities
requiring fuel, entities are routed to a refueling location, refueling occurs, and finally the
entity exits the system.
SPDS is capable of being connected to the tanks on land, but this requires additional time and
is more difficult to implement. This might lead to better port operations by allowing ships at
SPDS to access fuel on land. It allows the repaired system to act as an better integrated port.
However, this implementation would take longer to initially install, slowing recovery time
immediately after a disruption. Future work could implement this configuration of SPDS
and evaluate the benefits and trade-offs its use.
Other areas for future work could explore the pre-deployment of technologies. SPDS in
particular, can be deployed prior to a disruption, rather than in response to one. There can
be additional studies that can consider how many days before a disaster one would want to
deploy SPDS to avoid major disruptions.
62
List of References
Aven T, Ben-Haim Y, Boje Andersen H, Cox T, Droguett EL, Greenberg M, Guikema
S (2018) Society for Risk Analysis Glossary. (Society for Risk Analysis, McLean, 
Virginia).
Babick JP (2009) Tri-level optimization of critical infrastructure resilience. Master’s the-
sis, Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4652.
Becker AH, Matson P, Fischer M, Mastrandrea MD (2015) Towards seaport resilience for
climate change adaptation: Stakeholder perceptions of hurricane impacts in gulfport
(ms) and providence (ri). Progress in Planning 99:1–49.
Bencomo LA (2009) Modeling the Effects of a Transportation Security Inci-
dent on the Commercial Container Transportation System. Master’s thesis, De-
partment of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4648.
Berger DH, Gilday MM, Schultz KL (2020) Advantage at sea: Prevailing with integrated
all-domain naval power. Technical report, United States Coast Guard, United States
Marine Corps, United States Navy.
Bowers WJ, Wood TD (2020) The shield of the Indo-pacific. Proceedings 146,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/november/shield-indo-pacific.
Center for Strategic and International Studies (2020) Missiles of China. Missile Defense
Project. Accessed January 24, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/.
Department of Defense (2010a) Dockside utilities for ship service. Technical Report UFC
4-150-06, Washington, DC, https://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod/unified-facilities-criteria-
ufc/ufc-4-150-02.
Department of Defense (2010b) Military harbors and coastal facilities. Technical re-
port UFC 4-150-06, Washington, DC, https://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod/unified-facilities-
criteria-ufc/ufc-4-150-06.
Department of Defense (2017) Design: Piers and wharves. Technical report UFC 4-152-
01, Washington, DC, https://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod/unified-facilities-criteria-ufc/ufc-4-
152-01.
63
Department of Defense (2018) Pacific command change highlights growing
importance of indian ocean area. DOD News. Accessed January 25, 2021,
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1535808/pacific-command-
change-highlights-growing-importance-of-indian-ocean-area/.
Department of Defense (2020) Design: Petroleum fuel facilities. Technical Report UFC
3-460-01, Washington, DC, https://www.wbdg.org/ffc/dod/unified-facilities-criteria-
ufc/ufc-3-460-01.
Diogo A, Lima P, de mascarenhas FW, Frazzon EM (2015) Simulation-based planning
and control of transport flows in port logistic systems. Mathematical Problems in Engi-
neering 2015:1–12.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (2008) Port facility analysis for kawaihae
harbor. Technical report, Washington, DC, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1724-25045-7528/port_facility_analysis_for_kawaihae_harbor.pdf.
Geiser MT (2012) Improving Aircraft Refueling Procedures at Naval Air Station Oceana.
Master’s thesis, Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Mon-
terey, CA, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/7346.
Ghosh Dastidar R, Frazzoli E (2011) A queueing network based approach to distributed
aircraft carrier deck scheduling. Infotech@ Aerospace 2011 (Saint Louis, MO),
https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/10.2514/6.2011-1514.
Grainger A, Achuthan K (2014) Port resilience: a primer. (Nottingham 
MUniversity Business School, Nottingham, UK).
Hagen J, Morgan FE, Heim JL, Carroll M (2016) The foundations of operational
resilience–assessing the ability to operate in an anti-access/area denial (a2/ad) en-
vironment. Technical Report RR-1265, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA,
http://www.rand.org/t/RR1265.
Hosseini S, Barker K (2016) Modeling infrastructure resilience using bayesian networks:
A case study of inland waterway ports. Computers & Industrial Engineering 93:252–
266.
Kelton WD, Smith JS, Sturrock DT (2017) Simio and Simulation: Modeling, Analysis,
Applications Fourth Edition (Simio LLC).
Kotachi MA (2018) Sequence-based simulation-optimization framework with application
to port operations at multimodal container terminals .
Mattis J (2018) Summary of the 2018 national defense strategy of the united states of
america. Technical report, Department of Defense Washington United States.
64
NAVFAC EXWC (2021) About us. NAVFAC EXWC Accessed March 11, 2021,
https://www.navfac.navy.mil/navfac_worldwide/specialty_centers/exwc/about_us.html.
Onuska JJ (2012) Defending the Pittsburgh Waterways Against Catastrophic Disruption.
Master’s thesis, Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Mon-
terey, CA, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/7296.
Pant R, Barker K, Ramirez-Marquez JE, Rocco CM (2014) Stochastic measures of re-
silience and their application to container terminals. Computers & Industrial Engineer-
ing 70:183–194.
Pegden D (2014) An introduction to simio® for beginners.
Pidgeon ED (2008) Modeling the Effects of a Transportation Security Incident Upon the
Marine Transportation System. Master’s thesis, Department of Operations Research,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4043.
Russell HR (2020) Methodology for Quantifying Resiliency of Transportation Systems.
Master’s thesis, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, FL.
Sarewitz D, Pielke Jr R, Keykhah M (2003) Vulnerability and risk: some thoughts from
a political and policy perspective. Risk Analysis: An International Journal 23(4):805–
810.
Schroder L (2014) Applying queuing theory to the Port of Durban container terminal.
Doctoral dissertation, University of Pretoria.
Shen X (2017) Development of a hybrid simulation model for understanding community
resilience to fuel disruption. Master’s thesis, University of British Columbia.
Trump DJ (2017) National security strategy of the United States of America. Technical 
Mreport, Executive Office of The President, Washington DC.
 
USINDOPACOM (2021) Area of responsibility. USINDOPACOM Accessed January
29, 2021, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-
Responsibility/.
Vogel M (2019) Analysis of Ballistic Missile Defense Strike Operations Using
Stochastic Simulation Modeling of a Left-of-Launch Network. Master’s thesis,
Department of Operations Research, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/62836.
Wendler-Bosco V (2020) Coastal vulnerability: Impact of port disruptions and the eco-
nomic impacts of tropical cyclones .
65
Wendler-Bosco V, Nicholson C (2020) Port disruption impact on the maritime supply
chain: a literature review. Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure 5(6):378–394.
White House Office of the Press Secretary (2013) Presidential policy directive 21 –
critical infrastructure security and resilience. PPD-21 Accessed January 29, 2021,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.
Woods DD (2015) Four concepts for resilience and the implications for the future of re-
silience engineering. Reliability Engineering & System Safety 141:5–9.
Xu B, Li J, Yang Y, Wu H, Postolache O (2019) Model and resilience analysis for han-
dling chain systems in container ports. Complexity 2019.
66
Initial Distribution List
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
67
